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Abstract 
Communication interception for national security purposes, as well as for purposes of conducting 
a criminal investigation, is an invaluable asset of law enforcement agencies. In technical terms, 
this field has seen rapid advances in the last decade, while available software programmes and 
platforms for lawful interception (LI) are now able to monitor a broad spectrum of communication 
channels. Lawful interception of communications invariably intersects with fundamental rights 
and freedoms of persons in the European Union and the Member States. The purpose of this 
paper, as part of the discussion on the framework of lawful interception, is to present a study 
of advanced lawful interception software with its functionalities and processes, compare it with 
the most common lawful interception models and analyse the software architecture defined by 
the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) as a general standard. While this 
particular model of LI architecture has initially been designed to intercept voice communications, 
it can be successfully applied to intercept communications over Internet Protocol (IP) channels. 
Finally, the paper offers a comparative insight into different kinds of LI software and their 
capabilities in line with communication interception regulation.
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1. OVERVIEW OF LAWFUL INTERCEPTION OF TELECOMMUNICATION 
SERVICES
Lawful interception (LI) is a process of collecting information from the communication network 
for criminal investigation purposes by law enforcement authority (LEA). It is impossible to 
imagine life today without communication services such as phone calls, instant messaging, 
or e-mails. The same services can, as such, be abused for criminal or terrorist activities. This 
exploitation can take different forms, such as exchanging e-mail, voice or SMS communications 
between criminal parties for organising illegal drug traffic, human trafficking, terrorist acts, etc. 
Voice over IP (VoIP) and instant messaging applications could also carry traffic susceptible 
to interception and should be analysed under a lawful interception process using any legal, 
technological possibilities to identify the investigative value to the authorities during a criminal 
investigation.
When dealing with digitalisation and software/platform requirements, information security 
systems are the main key in planning and management to provide for the integrity, availability and 
confidentiality of information (Ermana & Tanuwijaya, 2012). The development of information 
and communication technology has created a significant leap in improving business efficiency 
and accuracy and increasing its productivity. Moreover, IT assets – such as data, networks, 
hardware, and software – are now considered one of the resources and essential operators of 
successful business organisations in the twenty-first century (Itrada et al., 2014; Samota & Patel, 
2017). The first step to achieve this is self-assessment of the reality of information security, 
known as gap-measurement (Al-Mayahi & Mansoor, 2012; Candiwan, 2014).
The process of gathering and evaluating information is increasingly susceptible to external 
influences and manipulations via information operations of state and non-state actors, particularly 
with the development of information technologies (Dokman & Malnar, 2019). Dynamic changes 
that characterise the modern security environment have been significantly driven and shaped by 
the rapid pace of technological development; its significant importance is found in the emergence 
and development of disruptive technologies that are changing the character of the security 
environment (Malnar & Olujić, 2019). With operating controls implemented, the system’s 
technical controls should include logical access controls, such as identification, authentication, 
authorisation, accountability (including audit trails), cryptography, and the classification of assets 
and users (Whitman & Mattford, 2018). Information security systems are of great importance 
for business organisations as they become the primary key for planning and management in 
modern enterprises to ensure the safety, availability and confidentiality of information (Ermana 
& Tanuwijaya, 2012). Evaluating the information security compliance level in organisations with 
internationally recognised standards is growing in importance because it has become popular 
as a common basis for information security measurement (Ifinedo, 2014).
Keeping that in mind, strategic IT systems, such as advanced LI models, have to ensure 
compliance with comprehensive national legislation. Moreover, they must be built according 
to the industry best practices and security frameworks to ensure they fit into telecommunication 
information systems governance (e.g. ITU-T X.1051 series, ISO 27011 series). The new genera-
tion LI systems are built to fit into the proposed methodology goals for supporting infrastructure, 
utilising and managing resources most effectively, applying security policies, access control, 
and other security objectives. These systems are created in line with the European Technical 
Standards Institute (ETSI) standards for LI, making them compatible with existing infrastructure 
and ensuring future interoperability.
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2. METHODOLOGY
Methodologies used in this paper are descriptive analysis, comparative analysis, macrostructural 
analysis and case study.
3. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN CROATIA
In their struggle to prevent crime and especially acts of terrorism, law enforcement agencies 
(LEA) give great importance to their ability to catch and isolate related network traffic. 
Authorised interception of electronic communication is an essential tool for protecting national 
interests, especially national security and investigating serious crimes. In the Croatian legal 
system, the Electronic Communications Act (ECA) regulates the rights and obligations of 
operators of public communication networks. 
The ECA provides the general framework of obligations for the public communication 
network operators concerning the facilitation of secret surveillance of electronic communica-
tions networks and services. Primarily, the Act demands that these operators ensure, finance 
and organise the function of secret surveillance of electronic communications networks and 
services as well as electronic communications lines to the operational and technical body 
competent for the surveillance of electronic communications under a special law regulating the 
field of national security (Article 108 of the ECA). This body also regulates the measures and 
standards of information security warranted by the ECA provisions for ensuring the function 
of secret surveillance of electronic communications networks and services.
The ECA also regulates that the obligations of operators of public communications 
networks and publicly available electronic communications services towards the competent 
body and other institutions and bodies authorised to perform secret surveillance of commu-
nications networks and services are regulated by laws regulating the legal framework of the 
system of national security and the Criminal Procedure Code. These provisions also limit 
individuals’ rights and freedoms with regard to personal data protection rights in electronic 
communications.
Articles 109 and 110 define the obligations the operators of public communications 
networks and publicly available electronic communications have in retaining electronic com-
munications data to enable conducting of the investigation, discovery and criminal prosecution 
of criminal offences. 
Article 110 defines the categories of retained data, such as the data necessary to trace 
and identify the source of communication, data necessary to identify the destination of the 
communication, data necessary to identify the date, time and duration of communication, 
data necessary to identify the type of communication, data necessary to identify users’ com-
munication equipment or what purports to be their equipment and the data necessary to 
identify the location of mobile communication equipment. The operators must also retain data 
relating to unsuccessful call attempts, whereby there is no obligation to retain data relating 
to unconnected calls. Article 110 also prohibits the retention of data by operators that may 
reveal the contents of the communication.
Article 339 of the Criminal Procedure Code regulates the procedure of enabling 
surveillance of electronic communications from the operators of public communications 
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networks and publicly available electronic communications in cases when there is reason to 
suspect that the owner or the user of electronic communication equipment has committed a 
criminal act punishable by imprisonment of five or more years.
Further clarification of the position and roles of the operational and technical body are 
regulated by Article 18 of the Security and Intelligence System Act. It defines the establish-
ment of the Operational and Technical Centre for Telecommunications Surveillance (OTC) for 
activating and managing the measures of secret surveillance of telecommunications services, 
activities and traffic. 
Additionally, the purpose of the OTC is to enable the operational-technical coordination 
between legal and natural persons operating public telecommunication networks and provi-
ding public telecommunications services and access services in the Republic of Croatia, and 
the bodies authorised to apply the measures of secret surveillance of telecommunications 
pursuant to the relevant Croatian legal framework. 
The OTC is authorised to supervise the work of telecommunications service providers 
in the fulfilment of the obligations these providers have according to applicable laws and to 
enable security and intelligence agencies and monitoring bodies to conduct the activation and 
management of the measures of secret surveillance of telecommunications services, activities 
and traffic employing appropriate technical interface.
The information and data collected through a lawful interception are very useful to law 
enforcement agencies for criminal prosecutions or for protecting national security. According 
to Kopal (2001), the most commonly used criminal analytics techniques are crime analysis, 
investigative analysis, operations analysis and intelligence analysis. Thanks to careful analysis, 
it has been possible to reconstruct relationships between the members of organised crime, 
highlighting the roles they hold and the strategies used for territorial control (Frazzica, 2016).
The most important state subsystems with the highest level of direct liability for the 
implementation of national security and national interests are the foreign policy subsystem, 
intelligence subsystem, military subsystem and economic subsystem. Therefore, the instru-
ments for the implementation of national security and national interests from each of these 
areas require particular attention. (Tatalović and Bilandžić, 2005, p. 74-75; Tatalović, 2011). 
The national security system implies a synthesis of all subsystems in society. Although it is 
common ground, it needs to be emphasised that not all subsystems share the same liability 
for implementing national security and national interests. (Maljak, Parlov and Sičaja, 2017).
Provisions such as these attest that in the modern legal framework, the interception 
of traditional telephone calls is well regulated by laws and procedures in most countries, 
supplemented by network components that participate in signalling and carrying traffic within 
a telecom network. The providers of telecommunication services are legally required (e.g. 
in the EU Member States as defined by Council Resolution, 1996) to assist LEAs in their 
endeavours by enabling electronic interfaces to monitor the traffic of individual subscribers. 
In this example, each EU Member State applies the requirements to their national laws and 
in line with national policies.
 Essentially, these requirements define that LEAs have access to the communication 
information of the interception subject, being either a person or persons specified in a lawful 
authorisation, whose telecommunications are to be intercepted. This information can be entire 
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communication transmitted to or from the telephone number or any service identifier that the 
subject uses and call-associated data generated to process the call.
Other collected information, as stated in the referenced document, are all call signalling, 
including signalling emitted by the subject, called party number of outgoing connections, 
calling party number for incoming connections, the timestamp of connection beginning, end 
and duration, actual destination and geographic location information for mobile subscribers. 
Moreover, security requirements are being implemented to satisfy the interception order, 
like the design and implementation of safeguards to prevent misuse or improper use and 
safeguard classified information about how many interceptions have been performed and 
how they are carried out. 
These requirements also give rise to challenges for the network operators (NWO) or 
service providers (SP) related to compliance, delivery, extraction, safety and cost.
4. CHALLENGES
The SPs are challenged continuously to comply with the requirement as their network is 
continually evolving. We have seen the change from traditional public switched telephone 
networks with related signalling such as SS7 to IP Multimedia Services (IMS) based on 
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). Besides, internet access is seeing upgrades in technologies 
and access speeds with current capabilities, as shown in Table 1 and reported by the European 
Court of Auditors (2018) for broadband access networks depicted in Figure 1. In 2019 we saw 
the introduction of 5G Mobile access technologies implementation, increasing the download 
and upload speeds of mobile subscribers even further. The said will pose a challenge on both 
the SP and LEA on how to cope with the substantial increase of the subscriber traffic and 
ensure reliable intercepted data delivery. 
Voice delivery has not changed much over the years. Still, constant change in network 
architecture, services and the development of new voice codecs, such as Enhanced Voice 
Services (EVS) codec, make voice delivery challenging on the latest network architectures 
for both operator and LEAs. Exploring different codecs used in telecommunications networks 
is not within the scope of this paper. It is, however, necessary to note that LEAs capability 
to decode the receiving data should also evolve in line with the technology or should utilise 
tools that will help them overcome these obstacles. 
Table 1: Broadband infrastructure types and current commercial technology
Wired or wireless Infrastructure Indicative download speed Indicative upload speed
Wired Fibre Up to 2.5 Gbps Up to 1.2 Gbps
Coaxial cable 300 Mbps up to 2 Gbps Up to 50 Mbps
Copper phone 5 Mbps up to 100 Mbps Up to 10 Mbps
Wireless Terrestrial wireless 60 Mbps Up to 10 Mbps
Satellite Up to 20 Mbps Up to 8 Mbps
Source: European Court of Auditors, 2018 [20]
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The second challenge is extracting the data belonging to the target and ensuring that 
no other traffic belonging to non-targets is delivered. This task is made more complex as the 
SP network architecture is evolving into a structure that consists of a mix of technologies 
supporting the SPs evolution of provided services and accommodating new ones. The best 
example are MNOs with 2G, 3G, 4G access technologies of varying mix getting ready for the 
5G introduction. In complex architectures, such as the ones depicted in Figure 3, the SP must 
ensure that intercepted data delivered to LEA is neither missing any communication data from 
the target nor including any of the non-targeted data, thus complying with data privacy laws.



















Core network InternetAgreggation networkLast mile
Source: Author’s work, 2020
Compliance with the lawful interception requirements is a must for the SPs. Still, they 
must also ensure the safety of the intercepted data and that it is undetectable by the target in 
any communication scenario or that it does not interfere with its subscribers’ services. In a 
continually evolving network environment, this is a serious challenge. The SPs are struggling 
to provide new services to their subscribers with minimum time to market and certify that they 
are tested for compliance, extending interception facilities. Auditing capabilities and network 
logging are thus important to ensure the data security and integrity are always maintained.
In order to be able to comply with these requirements, service providers are required 
to provide interfaces through which interception communication can be transmitted to a 
law enforcement monitoring facility (LEMF) in real-time. These interfaces are agreed upon 
between LEA and the SP, and so is the format of delivering communication data. Failure to 
maintain compliance would make operators susceptible to severe repercussions.
For this purpose, service providers install interception facilities to fulfil obligations 
defined by national laws and regulations, addressing the challenges stated above, and spe-
cialised vendors usually provide these facilities. Since laws and regulations define which 
subscribers are susceptible to lawful interception, there is a strict procedure on ensuring that 
the systems are not being misused. Technical requirements for lawful interception are defined 
by standards through standardisation bodies such as ETSI (European Telecommunication 
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Standards Institute), 3GPP (3G Partnership Project) and others, ensuring maximum compa-
tibility between different functional elements involved in the process of lawful interception. 
Interception facilities at the SPs should also have no impact on the performance and integrity 
of customer traffic. That is one of the major requirements that the SPs expect from providers 
of such solutions.
This case study will present the architecture for lawful interception and how mobile 
service providers face the above-referenced challenges referenced. The law and regulation of 
lawful interception are outside the scope of this paper. We will discuss potential solutions to 
operator challenges in more detail, referencing the next-generation lawful interception (NGLI) 
system Matison LIMS using the use case of implementing interception of communications 
in mobile networks.
5. ETSI ARCHITECTURE FOR LAWFUL INTERCEPTION
Lawful Interception Mediation system (LIMS) architecture is based on the reference model 
from ETSI and 3GPP standards and recommendations, using the same structure of modules 
and required interconnection interfaces. The same architecture is developed to conform to 
scalability for network growth in complexity and throughput while supporting all types of 
access technologies, circuit and packet networks, and enabling new technologies. The ETSI 
organisation proposed a basic reference model (ETSI TS 101 671 V3.14.1, 2016), and it is 
shown in Figure 2. The implementation of specific internal functions is described in ETSI 
TS 101 158 V1.3.1 (2014).
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This reference model enables the use of specific mediation systems to help LEAs mo-
nitor traffic from different applications using preferred interception analysis tools and reduce 
dependency on network technology.
In recent 15 years, traditional telephone communication networks were being gradually 
supplemented and, in certain cases, replaced by modern technology running over internet pro-
tocol (IP). What is more important is that traditional communication services are replaced by 
IP based services such as VoIP and RCS, and data traffic has already gained large momentum. 
We see these changes in relation to lawful interception reflected in new lawful interception 
implementations on intercepted data delivery (ETSI TS 102 232-1 V3.1.1, 2012).
In this architecture, communication to the network operator or the SP is maintained 
through handover interfaces (Hi). More specifically, handover interface 1 (Hi1) is used for 
provision interception order through the administration function. Handover interface 2 (Hi2) 
supports the delivery of Intercept Related Information (IRI) to LEA, such as the destination 
of a call, duration of a call, source of a call etc. Handover interface 3 (Hi3) carries the call 
Content of Communication (CC) from the network to LEA.
As depicted, the core element of the interception system is the Lawful Interception 
Mediation Function, which is used for:
• the collection of intercepted data from a network element such as soft switches, 
routers, probes, 
• encoding this data into a data stream that LEMF can understand,
• the correlation and delivery of the data to one or more LEAs,
• managing security and authorisation, 
• the protection of the data against unauthorised access or modification and
• logging function for auditing purposes.
Through this mediation, the Network operators/Service providers (NWO/SP) could 
deliver voice, internet access, e-mail, Short Messaging Service (SMS)/Multimedia Messaging 
Service (MMS), Rich Communication Service (RCS) on any fixed or mobile access technology.
6. IMPLEMENTATION IN MOBILE SERVICE PROVIDERS AND ADVANCED 
MODEL CASE STUDY
A typical mobile network operator (MNO) is usually a service provider and an access network 
provider (AP). It provides services to subscribers like e-mail, VoIP, etc., through wireless 
technology like 3G or 4G. The following Figure 3 shows the most common architecture that 
these mobile NWO/SPs have implemented to provide voice and internet access, along with 
other services.
In section 4, we have listed the challenges the NWO/SPs face in fulfilling government 
requirements for lawful interception, but additional ones complicate lawful interception com-
pliance.
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Throughput is continuously increasing, driven by the proliferation of streaming services. 
Mobile operators are thus constantly adapting their network, providing additional network 
elements and interconnecting links. These streaming services usually do not bring additional 
value to LEA, and it may be required to drop this traffic as it can saturate delivery.
It is not uncommon that a network consists of multi-vendor equipment, and such an 
environment might prove challenging for the delivery of the intercepted data. These different 
elements have to be connected to an interception mediation function, and operators must 
ensure that whenever there is a change in those elements, such as updating or upgrading, it 
will not affect the interception.
As depicted in Figure 3, each access technology utilises specialised network functions, 
and deploying new technology such as 5G will bring additional elements into operation 
like Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) and Session Management Function 
(SMF) (5GPPP Architecture Working Group, 2019). Mobile operators are required to ensure 
the delivery of intercepted data for these technologies before it is placed into commercial 
operation, even though such rising network complexity is a challenge in itself. The same goes 
for introducing subscriber services through the implementation of IMS (3GPP TS 22.228, 
2015) and VoLTE (GSMA IR.92, 2015).
Introducing a lawful interception solution for mobile operators, such as Matison LIMS 
(Matison, 2018), will help overcome these challenges. Essential for compliance with the re-
gulation, these systems do not bring commercial value for mobile operators while still facing 
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the necessary issue of operating, administrating and maintaining such systems. It should be 
noted that due to these challenges, operators have to consider interception systems that would 
reduce their operating cost while also providing faster adaption to their changing network 
environment, ensuring full compliance with LI regulation.
6.1. The process of lawful interception
In the process of interception, national law describes which conditions and restrictions 
will be employed before interception is allowed. If LEA considers interception as a tool for 
help in investigating serious crime, LEA will ask the prosecuting judge or responsible body 
to authorise the use of interception. If this is granted, LEA will present authorisation to the 
NWO/SP through the administration interface Hi1 or procedure. After this process is autho-
rised, IRI and CC are delivered to the LEMF. 
Mobile operator may receive multiple lawful authorisations that will depend on 
subscribed services used by the interception subject. In addition, a single interception subject 
may be requested for interception by different LEAs for different investigations. The LIMS 
system should be able to separate these investigations and LEAs if required, and each of these 
investigations may contain various constraints on IRI and CC.
While providing the administration of interception and delivery of IRI and CC, mobile 
operators should ensure security and authenticate LEAs in their attempt to gain interception 
data. Two-way authentication is also used to ensure that data is coming from the NWO/SP 
specified in the lawful authorisation. The NWO/SP should also assure data integrity and 
confidentiality, so the data is not modified or intercepted by a third party.
6.2. Implementing LIMS into the mobile operator network
Figure 4 shows a generic implementation of a LIMS system inside a mobile operator 
network. There are typically two methods of how interception is being performed, depen-
ding on the capabilities of the NWO/SP and other factors. These methods are shown in the 
following sections and consists of either Internal Interception Function (IIF) or External 
Interception Function (EIF). 
IIF enables LEA to directly receive IRI and CC from application servers through a 
mediation system and is the most straightforward way of receiving interception data. The 
advantage of this method is that it uses fewer points from which the target traffic data is 
extracted and delivered. The disadvantage is that it relies on the NWO infrastructure’s capa-
bilities and may provide bottlenecks or inadequate functionalities to support all interception 
requirements, as shown in Table 4, section 6.4. To be able to use IIF, network and application 
systems have to support secure data paths to a mediation platform.
On the other hand, EIF provides handling of intercepts on various scenarios where IIF 
cannot be used. For example, this is the case when network elements or application servers 
do not support LI implementations either due to the large volume of traffic or inherently by 
design, and modification of such systems to accommodate delivery and security mechanisms 
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required by LI cannot be provided. Depending on the deployed LIMS, the interception of the 
target under surveillance in such cases can be performed even on the highest capacity links. 
We will show in section 6.4 how the system can scale for some typical number of interceptions 
and what advantages the utilisation of next-generation LI systems can bring. 
Figure 4: Matison LIMS in the mobile service provider
Source: Matison, 2020
One of the most common services that do not support IIF is the e-mail service. E-mail 
servers are not designed to deliver targeted IRI and content through specialised ports dedicated 
to secure interception transmission. Besides, it is not possible to guarantee that intercepted 
data will not be detected, as there are no mechanisms in place to assure that requirement. In 
this case, EIF is used, and passive interception is implemented (see Figure 4). 
A typical implementation will consist of a taping device to duplicate the traffic and a 
probe to extract the required traffic coming to or going from the target. This device will utilise 
a mediation system to deliver IRI and CC to LEA. In the next generation LI system, it will 
be possible to control the probe and format CC according to any LEA requirements while 
ensuring the full security and integrity of data.
In case of lawful interception of mobile services running on 2G, 3G and 4G, implemen-
tation consists of active participation of the mediation system with network infrastructure 
using special interfaces called X1, X2 and X3. X1 is used by the Administration Function 
(ADMF) to send LI management commands to network elements. Network elements use X2 
and X3 interfaces to send intercepted data structured as IRI and CC toward the mediation 
function, as shown in Figure 4. This intercepted data sent over X2 and X3 will be ultimately 
sent toward LEA through the handover interface Hi2 and Hi3, as shown in section 5. 
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The ETSI reference architecture is built to allow for service separation that the next-
generation LI systems can utilise for scalability purposes.
6.3. Voice services
Intercepting voice services in mobile networks will require a mediation system to 
connect to switching servers and gateways, such as MSC-S, G-MSC-S, and MGW for legacy 
networks. Operators that have implemented IMS will need to interface mediation system with 
Call/Session Control Function (CSCF), Application Server (AS) and gateway to intercept IRI 
and CC from services such as Voice over LTE (VoLTE).
An alternative would be to use a passive solution and duplicate signalling and exchange 
call content at the central point in this architecture. 
6.4. Data services
Both active and passive interception scenarios are available for intercepting data servi-
ces, wherein the active scenario mediation system will connect with SGSN, MME and SGW/
PGW, respectively. In order to use the passive solution, traffic duplication will be needed 
around SGW/PGW, where the probe will monitor and extract communication data from targets 
and deliver them to the mediation. 
Other elements might also be interfaced depending on the implemented network ser-
vices. For instance, e.g. if Wi-Fi is implemented, Packet Data Gateway (PDG) would be 
connected to a mediation system for traffic collection, and AAA server correlates data such 
as IP address and user identity. 
The advantages of the next-generation LI system will be shown with the example 
of Matison LIMS as a representative of such systems. As noted in the sections above, the 
next-generation LI systems would utilise the reference LI architecture to build a distributed, 
scalable system capable of meeting today’s demands from the NWO/SPs.
One of the major requirements was to make sure the NWO/SP could utilise existing 
hardware suppliers, which provide cost savings in the long term by reducing OPEX. Efficiency 
in operation comes from the service scalability, as it will enable pay as you grow a model that 
follows the NWO/SP network growth.
Legacy LI systems typically have a linear increase of cost as the NWO/SP grows, as 
shown in Figure 6. The main reason is that new LI systems will be deployed for each new 
service and expand the existing ones. By scaling with services, the next-generation LI systems 
will utilise their advanced architecture to optimally scale only functional parts that are needed, 
thus lowering the total cost of ownership (TCO) for the NWO/SPs. 
An example is provided in Table 3. Voice packet sizes for typical implementations are 
stated in the following table (CISCO, 2016). For the sake of simplicity, we are referencing 
the G.729 codec. Standard VoLTE implementations will utilise more advanced codecs such 
as AMR or EVS.
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Table 2: Voice over IP - bandwidth consumption per call
Codec Information Bandwidth Calculations





























(64 Kbps) 80 Bytes 10 ms 4,1 160 Bytes 20 ms 50 87.2 Kbps
G.729  
(8 Kbps) 10 Bytes 10 ms 3,92 20 Bytes 20 ms 50 31.2 Kbps
G.723.1  
(6.3 Kbps) 24 Bytes 30 ms 3.9 24 Bytes 30 ms 33.3 21.9 Kbps
G.723.1  
(5.3 Kbps) 20 Bytes 30 ms 3.8 20 Bytes 30 ms 33.3 20.8 Kbps
Source: CISCO, 2016 [10]
For example, the total bandwidth required for a G.729 call for a default 20 bytes payload 
can be calculated using the formula: 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵ℎ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 =  𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 
𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 = 𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵  
  
(1)
Where voice packet size and packets per second can be calculated as in the following: 
 voice packet size = (Eth header + IP/UDP/RTP header + payload)* 8bits (2)
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵ℎ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 =  𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 
𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 = 𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵  
  
(3)
For interception, along with voice traffic, average data rates per subscriber need to be 
included. For the EU, we can use average data consumption in 2020 per subscriber estimates 
(ITU-R M.2370-0, 2015) to calculate the required throughput needed for data interception. 
Figure 5: Estimation of global mobile traffic per subscriber 
Source: ITU-R, 2015 [22]
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(Mb/s) Data (Mb/s) Total (Mb/s)
1000 31.20 1,400.16 1,431.36
2000 62.40 2,800.32 2,862.72
3000 93.60 4,200.48 4,294.08
4000 124.80 5,600.64 5,725.44
5000 156.00 7,000.80 7,156.80
6000 187.20 8,400.95 8,588.15
Source: Authors’ work, 2020
Figure 6 also shows how advanced filtering utilised in the next-generation LI systems 
can provide optimisations in a number of deployed LI mediations in the NWO/SP network, 
directly proportional to CAPEX and OPEX savings. For reference, we are using standard 
delivery mechanisms to LEA without irrelevant traffic drop that can provide even more 
benefits and 1G IP links are used for delivery. On standard commercial of the shelf (COTS) 
hardware, a direct impact on performance by 16% in a direct node vs node performance can 
be observed. However, if looking at the network level, with all intercepted services, we can 
observe up to 50% savings in the total cost of ownership (TCO).
Figure 6: Cost comparison of legacy vs the next-gen LI
Source: Authors’ work, 2020
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Active or Passive interception Both Separate systems
Converged LI system for fixed and mobile Yes No
Passive LI Probe throughput Up to 100 G Up to 10 G 
100 G with External system
Legacy voice and IMS voice Yes Separate system
Mobile 2G, 3G, 4G support Same system Separate system
New access types (e.g. 5G) Supported Separate system
Fixed Broadband access Any technology Any technology, but usually 
separate systems
COTS HW Yes Yes for LIMS, No for probe
Secured access Supported Supported
Mediation of X3 /Hi3 interface Supported Not supported
Centralised target management Yes No
Advanced codec support Yes No
High Availability Yes Yes
Abstraction layer in collection and delivery Yes No
Advanced logging capability Yes No
Whitelisting Yes Yes
Statistics Yes Yes
Source: Authors’ work, 2020
Table 4 shows a comparison of the next-generation LI system with legacy LI. Flexible 
architecture, the main advantage of such systems, provides different benefits to the NWO/
SP. One of the major ones is cost-benefit. By utilising modular architecture and support of 
all major network types, operators take advantage of the service based optimisations and 
scalability of the platform. Scaling the system to accommodate growth in data throughput, 
the number of network elements, the number of targets, and simultaneous interception targets 
will enable operators to have direct and indirect benefits, such as utilising less infrastructure 
and simplifying operation and maintenance.
With advanced features such as X3/Hi3 mediation, codec support, layered collection 
and delivery abstraction, there is no interference with the SP network, and LEAs can reliably 
receive the intercepted data.
As a representative of the next-generation LI systems, Matison, through its Matison 
LIMS system, enables the telecommunication service providers (SP) compliance with regu-
latory requirements and the automatisation of operative tasks related to lawful interception 
(LI). With this approach, Matison LI is built to ensure a cost-effective interception solution 
for network deployments of varying complexity.
127
Natalija Parlov, Željko Sičaja, Tihomir Katulić, Riko Lusa: Informacijska sigurnost...
Polic. sigur. (Zagreb), godina 30. (2021), broj 1, str. 112 - 130
The Matison LIMS architecture is shown in and allows Matison LI to be utilised in 
any mobile, fixed, cable or internet service provider network scenario without compromising 
subscriber services’ performance or reliability. It handles voice, fax, SMS, MMS, e-mail, 
voicemail, RCS, and internet access on a single platform. It addresses the growing need to 
support emerging services and access technologies such as 5G. Its service scalability and 
modular architecture ensure extension and adaptability to new services, technology, or changes 
in national legislation and regulatory requirements.
By utilising this system, interception is performed in real-time and enhances operational 
capabilities of intelligence organisations through non-intrusive all-software technology that 
easily integrates into any operator network and enables gathering and the analysis of evidence 
during criminal investigations. 
Figure 7: Matison LIMS
Source: Matison, 2020
Using the next-generation LI system provides benefits over standard LI systems that 
span several categories and can be compared in Table 4.
The Administration and Mediation Functions are logical components of Matison LIMS 
in charge of target handling processes, configuration, auditing and data consistency checking. 
It receives target information over the HI1 interface. Two types of communication interfaces 
are available for setting the target: over REST API or on the Matison LIMS GUI (Web Portal 
for Administration). Target information is forwarded to NE or Probe and Mediation Function 
for correlation over the X1 interface. For elements where target ID changes (e.g. DHCP/
Radius server map MAC address/username to target ID), additional actions are triggered to 
update that mapping. 
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Besides, Mattison LI employs user management and role-based security, where 
system-wide policy is defined together with secure logging. It is imperative to have highly 
controlled, secure access to the system, and this was built to enable clearance access to every 
part of the system.
To scale with the NWO network, the administration function can take the form of a 
separate system. The said will enable additional functionalities required by the NWO/SP, 
such as LI consolidation. 
7. CONCLUSION
As information technology, in general, continues to rapidly change and advance, the same 
goes for electronic communications. As we have witnessed over the last two decades, the case 
of mobile network technology proves this by generations of this technology being introduced 
in less time than it took to establish the previous. 
The availability of mobile connectivity, especially internet access, has allowed for the 
proliferation of new communication services. For these services, operators are also obliged 
towards their users to keep their data and communication secure, and these days, almost uni-
versally, providers of these services have to conform to national or international legislation 
to secure and encrypt communication and data. 
Prediction of future data usage shows an exponential increase. With improvements 
to communication technology, encryption of communication channels is applying the latest 
cryptography developments to enable widespread and efficient end-to-end encryption. The 
technology used in modern LI systems is advancing in the same significant leaps, adapting 
to avoid the obstacles imposed by new services and law enforcement organisations have to 
follow the dynamics of the market. 
National security faces critical challenges now more than ever as the digital service 
market is booming and a multitude of new communication services spring up all over cyber-
space. Both LEAs and NWO/SPs have an essential role in the process of ensuring that threats 
are discovered, localised and adequately processed. Telecom operators are obliged to conform 
to local legislation. While modern privacy legislation does significantly improve the position 
of individuals concerning their rights and freedoms, this development might impede business 
opportunities and prevent service providers from offering new services to their customers. 
LEAs decide what information are required to perform their duties, and their ability to decode 
the information might be impeded by advancing technology in communication services. The 
improvement in the chain of lawful interception from both angles will ensure that the NWO/
SPs deploy new services faster, without interference in the process of LI. Hence, LEAs will 
be able to inspect the information received and will not limit NWO/SP capabilities. 
There are new solutions on the market built to withstand the changes in communica-
tion technology through new architectural design and to adapt to new services and access 
technologies. Both LEAs and NWO/SPs should rethink their current strategies and see new 
solutions to ensure compatibility with future services and technology and enable flexibility 
in operative tasks of performing interceptions.
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Natalija Parlov, Željko Sičaja, Tihomir Katulić, Riko Lusa
Informacijska sigurnost i funkcija tajnog nadzora komunikacija putem infrastrukture 
davatelja telekomunikacijskih usluga: model napredne arhitekture sustava
Tajni nadzor komunikacija koji se rabi za potrebe nacionalne sigurnosti i u svrhu provođenja policijskih 
istražnih radnji vrijedno je tehničko sredstvo i koristan alat tijela policijskog, pravosudnog i sigurnosnog 
sustava. U tehničkim aspektima, ovo polje bilježi značajne pomake u posljednjem desetljeću gdje su 
dostupni softver i platforme za provođenje tajnog nadzora proširene mogućnostima nadzora širokog 
spektra različitih komunikacijskih kanala. Funkcija tajnog nadzora komunikacija u suštini predstavlja 
ograničenje temeljnih prava pojedinaca na području Europske unije i država članica. Svrha ovog rada 
kao priloga raspravi o mehanizmima tajnog nadzora jest izložiti osobine modela naprednog softvera 
razvijenog u svrhu tajnog nadzora, usporedba s najčešćim modelima tajnog nadzora i analiza softverske 
arhitekture definirane od strane Europskog instituta za telekomunikacijske norme (ETSI) kao 
dominantne norme u ovom području. Iako se ovaj model arhitekture tajnog nadzora razvio inicijalno 
za nadzor glasovnih komunikacija, može ga se uspješno primijeniti i za tajni nadzor komunikacija koje 
koriste internet protokol (IP). Konačno, članak pruža komparativni pregled različitog softvera tajnog 
nadzora u skladu s regulativom funkcije tajnog nadzora.
